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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000342

SIPDIS  
SENSITIVE

STATE FOR AF/C, S/USSES  
NSC FOR GAVIN  
LONDON FOR POL - LORD  
PARIS FOR POL - KANEDA AND BAIN  
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU

E.O. 12958: N/A  
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PREF](#) [MOPS](#) [PHUM](#) [LY](#) [QA](#) [SU](#) [UN](#) [CD](#)  
SUBJECT: FORMIN DENIES ATTACKING SUDAN AND SEIZING  
PROPERTY, CONFIRMS CHAD OPEN TO "VERIFICATION"

REF: A. NJAMENA 336  
[1](#)B. NDJAMENA 334  
[1](#)C. NDJAMENA 311

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SUMMARY  
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[1](#)1. (SBU) Chadian Foreign Minister Moussa Faki Mahamat told Ambassador August 13 that no/no Chadian military units had attacked Sudanese villages in recent weeks; that the GOC had not/not seized any Sudanese properties in Chad, but had prohibited the reopening of the Sudanese School in Ndjamenana for security reasons; and that Chad was willing to let third-counties "verify" its compliance with commitments on assistance to Sudanese rebels on Chad territory. Faki indicated that Libyan bilateral efforts to normalize Chad-Sudan relations were taking precedence over the Dakar Accord process, that Ahmat Soubiane would be welcomed back to Chad when his current activities in Tripoli and perhaps Khartoum were finished, and that the GOC had welcomed 3,000 ex-rebels to Chad in 2009. The FORMIN also reiterated that UNICEF was welcome to visit any military installation at any time.

[1](#)2. (SBU) Faki's denial of Chadian military incursions into Sudan and his remarks on the Sudanese School in Ndjamenana are consistent with other views here on these subjects (REFS A and B). We got the impression that the GOC was souring on the Dakar Accord process and cottoning to Libya's renewed interest and investment in the bilateral relationship and its effort to see Chad-Sudan relations normalized (SEPTEL). We will continue to monitor (and mentor) the GOC on TIP compliance.

[1](#)3. (SBU) Given Faki's repetition of Chad's willingness to have others "verify" its compliance with commitments to end support to Sudanese rebels on its territory, we should think about making a concrete proposal on this issue. The Libyans have been talking to the GOC about "verification" and MINURCAT SRSG Angelo told us last week (REF A) that he could support "verification" by providing transport and security to verifiers. We should consider crafting a concrete proposal if we want to move forward on "verification." END SUMMARY.

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CHAD-SUDAN RELATIONS  
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14. (SBU) The FORMIN discounted all Sudanese claims that Chadian National Army (ANT) had crossed the border and raided Sudanese villages in recent weeks. He stated that he had instructed Chad's Ambassador to the UN to respond in kind to Sudan's accusatory letter to the Security Council. Faki said that Sudan utilized such propaganda either to justify, or alternately to draw attention away from, Sudanese military activity in the border area. He underscored that Chad troops had no intention of crossing the border, unlike Sudan whose military had infiltrated villages in eastern Chad.

15. (SBU) Faki said unequivocally that the GOC had not/not seized any Sudanese properties in Chad. He said there was one school in N'Djamena that the GOC had decided not to allow to reopen, because the GOC had its doubts about the true role of the "teachers" the GOS provided. He added that another Sudanese school existed in Abeche, but that it had not functioned for a long time. Faki emphasized that the GOC had not seized anything, "not even one paper" of Sudanese property despite Sudanese aggression against Chad. Faki complained that the contents of the Chad Embassy in Khartoum, looted in May 2008, had never been returned to the GOC.

16. (SBU) Faki confirmed that Chad was willing to let third-counties "verify" its compliance with commitments on assistance to Sudanese rebels on Chad territory (REF C). Faki noted that a meeting of the Dakar Contact Group was still possible at the end of September, after Ramadan, in Khartoum, but said that there still had been no Sudanese invitation to such an event. Faki added that Tripoli was increasingly active in trying to normalize Chad-Sudan relations, including through the Chad-Libya Mixed Commission, at meetings

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following the AU summit, and a proposed end-of-August conference in Tripoli on "Conflict in Africa."

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CHAD-CHAD REBEL GROUPS  
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17. (SBU) On GOC views of the Chad rebel groups, Faki said that the situation was consistent with the normal quiet period of the rainy season. Faki said that Soubiane had returned from Khartoum and gone to Tripoli for meetings with The Guide, among others, but would definitively return to Chad. The FORMIN stated that there were substantive discussions with other rebel groups at the moment and that the GOC would not shut the door on additional returns. Faki noted that the GOC counted nearly 3,000 rebels who had deserted the rebellion and returned to Chad since January of this year.

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GOC AND TIP  
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18. (SBU) Faki commented that the GOC was open to UNICEF visits to military installations for assessment of child soldiers. He emphasized that UNICEF was free to visit any GOC military installation at any time. (NOTE: UNICEF ResRep told us separately August 13 that he had yet to receive any GOC permission for these visits. END NOTE.)

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COMMENT  
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19. (SBU) Faki's denial of Chadian military incursions into Sudan and his remarks on the Sudanese School in Ndjama are consistent with other views here on these subjects (REFS A and B). We got the impression that the GOC was souring on the Dakar Accord process and cottoning to Libya's renewed interest and investment in the bilateral relationship and its effort to see Chad-Sudan relations normalized (SEPTEL). We

will continue to monitor (and mentor) the GOC on TIP compliance.

¶10. (SBU) Given Faki's repetition of Chad's willingness to have others "verify" its compliance with commitments to end support to Sudanese rebels on its territory, we should think about making a concrete proposal on this issue. The Libyans have been talking to the GOC about "verification" and MINURCAT SRSg Angelo told us last week (REF A) that he could support "verification" by providing transport and security to verifiers. We should consider crafting a concrete proposal if we want to move forward on "verification." END COMMENT.

¶11. (U) Minimize considered.  
NIGRO